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Abstract 
 
In this work, the JRC applies its Smart Grid CBA methodology to a full-scale project rather than only to a small-size demonstrative 
one. To this end, the JRC and ACEA - one of Italy’s biggest Distribution System Operators (DSOs), in charge of managing the 
distribution system of Rome - teamed up to study the merits of deploying Smart Grid technologies (preliminarily tested in a pilot 
project) in a big city like the Italian capital, hosting several million electricity users. 
The ACEA Smart Grid Pilot Project (named "Malagrotta" after the area where pilot solutions were first realised) is the starting point 
for this study, as it displays many of the characteristics of emerging Smart Grids projects and interconnects several diversified 
generation facilities (like biogas, waste-to-electricity and PV plants) and consumption centres. 
This study illustrates the outcome of the application of the JRC Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to a) the ACEA Smart Grids pilot project; 
and b) the planned deployment of Smart Grid technologies (tested in the ACEA Smart Grids pilot project) to the whole of the city of 
Rome. The CBA is conducted from both the private investor’s and the societal perspective, in order to assess whether scaling up the 
Smart Grid pilot project benefits the distribution operator and the citizens. 
Finally, this report shows how the JRC's CBA methodology can be effectively used to assess the financial and economic viability of 
real Smart Grids projects and help the investment decisions of DSOs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - ITALIAN 
 
La Smart Grid, la nuova generazione di reti elettriche intelligenti, rappresenta un 
imprescindibile ingrediente per lo sviluppo della futura rete elettrica e promette di 
cambiare drasticamente la maniera in cui l'energia elettrica viene generata, 
scambiata e commercializzata. La questione aperta riguarda come questi 
cambiamenti possano aiutare gli Stati Membri dell'Unione Europea (EU) nel 
raggiungere gli ambiziosi traguardi definiti nelle politiche energetiche UE in termini 
di sicurezza di approvvigionamento, sostenibilità e competitività. 
Di fatto, gli investimenti in progetti pilota Smart Grid sono molto aumentati negli 
ultimi dieci anni, superando i €3 miliardi solo in Europa. Tuttavia, alcune questioni 
fondamentali restano irrisolte: vale la pena di investire in Smart Grids? C'è un 
business case per sviluppare in città più ampie, o in intere regioni, le soluzioni Smart 
Grid testate a livello locale? In che misura i cittadini beneficerebbero di tale 
innovazione? 
Coerentemente con la propria missione di sostegno scientifico per le decisioni 
politiche, il JRC ha sviluppato una serie di strumenti e metodologie per osservare, 
simulare e valutare gli sviluppi delle Smart Grid. In particolare, dato il loro potenziale 
economico e i notevoli investimenti necessari, il JRC ha prodotto la prima 
metodologia europea per l'analisi costi-benefici (CBA) di Smart Grid. L'obiettivo più 
ampio della metodologia è quello di coprire anche gli impatti socio-economici dei 
progetti di Smart Grid, quindi non limitando l'analisi ai soli costi e benefici relativi 
all'attore direttamente responsabile del progetto Smart Grid. 
In questo lavoro, per la prima volta, il JRC verifica e applica la sua metodologia CBA 
per Smart Grid a un progetto su larga scala, piuttosto che solamente a uno 
dimostrativo su dimensioni ridotte. A tal fine, il JRC e ACEA - uno dei più grandi 
operatori della rete di distribuzione in Italia (distribution system operator - DSO), 
responsabile della gestione del sistema di distribuzione di Roma - hanno unito le 
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forze per studiare gli impatti di tecnologie Smart Grid (preliminarmente testate in un 
progetto pilota) in una grande città come la capitale italiana che ospita oltre un 
milione di utenti di energia elettrica. 
Il progetto pilota Smart Grid di ACEA (denominato "Malagrotta", come la zona in cui 
le soluzioni pilota sono state realizzate) è il punto di partenza di questo studio; esso, 
infatti, mostra molte delle caratteristiche dei progetti Smart Grid emergenti e 
potrebbe essere replicato su una notevole porzione della rete di distribuzione di 
Roma, interconnettendo diverse strutture di generazione (come impianti a biogas, 
termovalorizzatori e impianti fotovoltaici) e centri di consumo. 
Il progetto Smart Grid di ACEA esamina nuove soluzioni di automazione, 
monitoraggio e telecontrollo in diversi segmenti e a vari livelli di tensione della rete 
di distribuzione. Più in dettaglio, il progetto si articola in tre sottoprogetti: 
a. Automazione della rete a Media tensione; 
b. Monitoraggio e Telecontrollo della rete in Media e Bassa tensione; 
c. Nuovi criteri di gestione della rete. 
L'estensione del progetto all'intera città di Roma comporterebbe, tra l'altro, 
l'ampliamento dell'area di impatto dalle due cabine primarie ad Alta/Media tensione 
(AT/MT) testate nel progetto pilota, al totale di 70 cabine primarie AT / MT gestite da 
ACEA nella città di Roma. 
Questo studio illustra il risultato dell'applicazione dell'analisi costi-benefici (CBA) 
secondo la metodologia JRC: 
 al progetto pilota Smart Grid realizzato da ACEA a Malagrotta; 
 alla prevista installazione di tecnologie Smart Grid (testate nel progetto pilota 
ACEA Smart Grid) in tutta la città di Roma. 
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La CBA è condotta sia dal punto di vista dell'investitore privato, sia da quello sociale 
al fine di valutare se un'eventuale estensione dell'investimento in Smart Grid 
comporterebbe importanti benefici per il complesso della cittadinanza. 
I valori dei parametri scelti per la monetizzazione di costi e benefici - che si estende 
da tassi di sconto finanziari e sociali fino ai prezzi della CO2 - sono spiegati e 
argomentati nel dettaglio. Insieme ai benefici finanziari relativi a miglioramenti nelle 
prestazioni in termini di gestione della rete elettrica nel progetto (come retribuite dal 
Regolatore), la CBA dell'investitore privato comprende anche la remunerazione degli 
investimenti in conto capitale (CAPEX) alle tariffe stabilite dal Regolatore italiano. 
Questa remunerazione, tipica delle imprese regolate nell'Unione Europea e in molti 
altri Paesi, ha lo scopo di incentivare il DSO ad investire nel miglioramento 
dell'infrastruttura che gestisce, ad esempio implementando reti intelligenti, 
condividendo parte del valore monetario del benessere dei consumatori che ne 
deriva. Potendo venire interpretata come una (pur parziale) misura monetaria di tale 
benessere, la remunerazione degli investimenti definita dall'autorità di regolazione 
competente è impiegata come fattore anche nella CBA societaria. 
Sulla base della precedente serie di ipotesi, lo studio procede nel presentare i risultati 
della CBA per investitori privati in termini di valore attuale netto (NPV) e tassi di 
rendimento interni (IRR) per il progetto Smart Grid Malagrotta e per il progetto 
esteso alla città di Roma. I risultati sono riportati qui di seguito: 
             CBA Investitore privato MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Progetto Smart Grid (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Valore attuale netto anno 2014) -K€ 1,262   K€ 35,972 
IRR (Tasso di rendimento interno) 1.23%   16.60% 
 
Tabella 1 Risultati della CBA per investitori privati per il progetto Malagrotta e la sua 
estensione a Roma (valori in K€, anno base 2014) 
I risultati della CBA societaria, invece, sono presentati nella seguente tabella: 
vi 
 
CBA Societaria MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Progetto Smart Grid (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Valore attuale netto anno 2014) -K€ 1,104   K€ 39,119 
IRR (Tasso di rendimento interno) 1.25%   16.67% 
 
Tabella 2 Risultati della CBA societaria per il progetto Malagrotta e la sua  
estensione a Roma (valori in K€, anno base 2014) 
Come si può vedere, sia nella CBA per investitori privati che nella CBA sociale i 
risultati di base per l'intera rete di distribuzione di Roma sono positivi, mentre il 
progetto di Malagrotta deve affrontare le tipiche problematiche di un progetto pilota 
(inclusi costi irrecuperabili e rischi di innovazione) che porta a perdite di entità 
moderata (mantenendo comunque gli IRR positivi, seppur inferiori ai tassi di sconto). 
Come previsto, l'NPV e l'IRR nell'analisi sociale sono più elevati per tutti i progetti, 
poiché tengono in considerazione anche i benefici derivanti dal progetto all'intera 
cittadinanza. Ciò è dovuto alla riduzione dei valori di tasso di sconto (il tasso di 
sconto sociale è inferiore a quello di un investitore privato), oltre che all'introduzione 
di esternalità monetizzate (emissioni di CO2 evitate). 
Una completa analisi di sensibilità viene effettuata al fine di testare la robustezza dei 
risultati per variazioni (in particolar modo avverse) degli elementi di 
condizionamento. In tutta l'analisi, al variare dei parametri associati alle variabili i 
valori di NPV si mantengono positivi per l'estensione del progetto all'intera rete di 
Roma; questo vale anche per tassi d’incremento annuale piuttosto drastici dei costi 
CAPEX e OPEX (rispettivamente 16% e 6%), volti a simulare gli effetti di un’eventuale 
brusca crescita dell’inflazione importata (che potrebbe concentrare i propri effetti 
sull’investimento in macchinari). 
Nel complesso, considerata la gamma di variazione dei parametri utilizzati per questa 
CBA, le prospettive per l'ammodernamento della rete elettrica di Roma tramite il 
progetto Smart Grids di ACEA possono dunque essere considerate molto positive. 
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Chiaramente, con il proseguimento della sperimentazione di Smart Grid su porzioni 
della rete di distribuzione di Roma (ad esempio testando l'impatto di specifiche 
tecnologie di stoccaggio e dei veicoli elettrici), l'analisi proposta deve essere 
aggiornata di conseguenza per individuare ulteriori beneficiari e nuovi vantaggi 
nell'impiego delle soluzioni Smart Grid.  
Inoltre, vale la pena notare come i consumatori finali attivi sono ritenuti un elemento 
centrale per l'ampliamento in larga scala delle reti intelligenti. Questo riporta al fatto 
che l'impatto di ciascun progetto Smart Grid può andare oltre quanto percepito in 
termini monetari; per ottenere quindi un quadro più completo delle problematiche 
legate alla scalabilità delle Smart Grid, la CBA economico-finanziaria dovrebbe essere 
integrata con studi mirati sul ruolo del consumatore finale e valutazioni non 
monetarie sugli impatti e sulle esternalità non quantificabili (ad esempio l'impatto 
sociale e sulla salute, o il contributo agli obiettivi di policy). 
In conclusione, il JRC continuerà a monitorare lo stato di avanzamento di questo e di 
altri progetti, lavorando con le parti interessate alle Smart Grid per far luce sulle 
possibilità e le modalità per cui le reti intelligenti rappresentino un'attività redditizia 
per gli investitori e benefica per la società nel suo complesso. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - ENGLISH 
 
The Smart Grid, the upcoming generation of intelligent electricity networks, promises 
to drastically change the way power is produced, exchanged and traded. The open 
question is how these changes in the electricity networks can help the European 
Union (EU)’s Member States in achieving the ambitious security of supply, 
sustainability and competitiveness targets defined in the EU energy policies.  
Indeed, Smart Grid investment in pilot projects has been booming over the last 
decade, exceeding €3 billion in Europe alone. However, key questions remain to be 
answered: is investing in Smart Grids worth the cost? Is there a business case for 
scaling up locally tested Smart Grid solutions to wider cities or regions? To what 
extent can citizens benefit from such innovation? 
Consistent with its mission of providing science-based support to policy makers, the 
JRC has developed a series of tools and methodologies to observe, simulate and 
assess Smart Grid developments. Particularly, given the economic potential of the 
Smart Grid and the substantial investments required, the JRC produced the first EU 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) methodology for Smart Grids. The wider aim of the 
methodology is to cover socio-economic impacts of Smart Grid projects, thus not 
limiting the analysis to costs and benefits incurred by the actor(s) implementing the 
Smart Grid project. 
In this work, for the first time, the JRC tests and applies its Smart Grid CBA 
methodology to a full-scale project rather than only to a small-size demonstrative 
one. To this end, the JRC and ACEA - one of Italy’s biggest Distribution System 
Operators (DSOs), in charge of managing the distribution system of Rome - teamed 
up to study the merits of deploying Smart Grid technologies (preliminarily tested in a 
pilot project) in a big city like the Italian capital, hosting more than a million 
electricity users. 
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The ACEA Smart Grid Pilot Project (named "Malagrotta" after the area where pilot 
solutions were first realised) is the starting point for this study, as it displays many of 
the characteristics of emerging Smart Grids projects and interconnects diversified 
generation facilities (like biogas, waste-to-electricity and PV plants) and consumption 
centres.  
The ACEA Smart Grid Project tests novel automation, monitoring and remote control 
solutions on different sections and voltage levels of the distribution grid. More in 
detail, the project is articulated into three sub-projects:  
a. Automation,  
b. Medium Voltage/Low voltage Monitoring and Remote Control, and  
c. New Network Management Criteria.  
Scaling the project up to the city of Rome would entail, among others, expanding the 
impact area from the two High Voltage/Medium Voltage (HV/MV) primary 
substations covered by the pilot project to the whole set of 70 HV/MV primary 
substations operated by ACEA in the city of Rome. 
This study illustrates the outcome of the application of the JRC Cost Benefit Analysis 
(CBA) to: 
 the Smart Grids pilot project realised by ACEA in Malagrotta area; 
 the planned deployment of Smart Grid technologies (tested in the ACEA 
Smart Grids pilot project) to the whole of the city of Rome. 
The CBA is conducted from both the private investor’s and the societal perspective to 
assess whether the Smart Grid investment might be scaled up to benefit the 
distribution operator and the citizens. 
The parameter values chosen for cost and benefit monetisation - spanning from the 
financial/societal discount rates to the CO2 price - are explained and supported in 
detail. Along with standard financial benefits due to project-related performance 
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improvements in managing the grid (as remunerated by the Regulator), the private-
investor CBA also includes the return on the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) of 
infrastructure (CAPEX) investments at the rates established by the Italian Regulator. 
Such remuneration, typical of regulated companies across the EU and many other 
Countries, aims to incentivise DSOs by allowing them to capture part of the 
monetary value of the consumers’ welfare gains deriving from targeted innovative 
investments such as Smart Grids. Since they can be interpreted as an - albeit partial - 
monetary measure of such gains, such regulated returns are also employed to factor 
those gains into the Societal CBA. 
Based on the previous set of assumptions, the study proceeds to present the Private-
investor CBA results regarding the Net Present Values (NPV) and Internal Rates of 
Return (IRR) for the Malagrotta Smart Grid Project and the Rome Smart Grid upscale. 
These are reported below in Table 1: 
Private investor CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Smart Grid project (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 1,262   K€ 35,972 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.23%   16.60% 
 
Table 1: Outcomes of the Private investor CBA for the Malagrotta project and its 
extension to Rome (values in K€, base year 2014) 
The Societal CBA results, instead, are shown in the following Table 2: 
Societal CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Smart Grid project (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 1,104   K€ 39,119 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.25%   16.67% 
 
Table 2: Outcomes of the Societal CBA for the Malagrotta project and its 
extension to Rome (values in K€, base year 2014) 
As shown, in both Private-investor and Societal CBAs the baseline results for the 
whole of Rome’s grid are positive, whereas the Malagrotta project faces the typical 
challenges of a pilot project (including sunk costs and innovation risks) leading to 
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generating losses of moderate size (so that IRRs, though lower than the discount 
rates, are positive). As expected, Societal NPVs and IRRs are higher for all projects, as 
they take into account also the benefits accruing to the society at large. This is due to 
lower discount rate values (social discount rates are typically lower than those of a 
private investor) and to the introduction of monetised externalities (avoided CO2 
emissions). 
A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to put to test the 
robustness of the results to variations (especially adverse) in the conditioning factors. 
For the entire range of variation of the parameter values considered, NPV figures for 
the whole of Rome’s grid retain their positive sign; this holds as well for rather 
aggressive annual increase rates of CAPEX and OPEX costs (16% and 6% 
respectively), meant to simulate the effects of a sharp rise in imported inflation 
(which may concentrate its effects on machinery investment). 
Therefore, considering the variation ranges of the parameters used for this CBA, the 
overall outlook for ACEA’s Smart Grids modernisation project of Rome’s electricity 
network may be deemed very positive. 
Clearly, as the Smart Grid experimentation on portions of the distribution grid of 
Rome continues (e.g. by testing the impact of selected storage and Electric Vehicle 
technologies) the proposed analysis shall be updated accordingly to identify 
additional beneficiaries and merits of the Smart Grid solutions deployment.  
Additionally, it is worth noting how active end-consumers are expected to be central 
for the large-scale roll-out of Smart Grids. This reminds one of the fact that the 
impact of each Smart Grid project can go beyond what can be captured in monetary 
terms; therefore, in order to obtain a more complete picture of the Smart Grid 
scalability challenges, the financial/economic CBA should be complemented with 
targeted studies on the end-consumer role and non-monetary appraisals of non-
xii 
 
quantifiable impacts and externalities (e.g. social/health impacts, contribution to 
policy goals).  
In conclusion, the JRC will continue monitoring the progress of this and other 
projects by working with relevant Smart Grid stakeholders in order to shed light on 
whether and how Smart Grids present a viable business case for investors and society 
as a whole.  
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1. Introduction 
The JRC started investigating what Smart Grids can deliver in the current European 
landscape by creating the first European Smart Grids projects inventory. This annual 
outlook, today at its 4th edition, not only features the type of Smart Grid application 
tested, but also includes data on investments and funding for each project, and 
indicates that cumulated investment amounts to €3.19 billion from 2002 until today 
(JRC, 2014). 
Is investing in Smart Grids worth the cost? They are often considered as solutions still 
in a testing phase that will come to commercial maturity only at a future time. 
Consistent with its mission of providing science-based support to policy makers, the 
JRC wanted to shed light on whether Smart Grids represent a viable business already 
today. 
Given the economic potential of the Smart Grid and the substantial investments 
required, there is a need for a methodological approach to estimate the costs and 
benefits of Smart Grids, based as much as possible on data from Smart Grid pilot 
projects. 
The JRC developed a series of tools to assess Smart Grids projects, starting from the 
first EU Cost-Benefit Analysis methodology (JRC, 2012). However, a detailed and fact-
based evaluation must rely on real solutions tested in existing distribution grids.  
The challenge of a formal assessment framework for Smart Grid projects is linked to 
three main reasons (Jackson, 2011): 
 Smart Grid projects are typically characterised by high initial costs and benefit 
streams that are uncertain and often long-term in nature. In fact, many Smart 
Grid benefits are systemic in nature, i.e. they only come into play once the entire 
smart electricity system is in place and new market players have successfully 
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assumed their roles.   
 Smart Grid assets provide different types of functions to enable Smart Grid 
benefits. A variety of technologies, software programmes and operational 
practices can all contribute to achieving a single Smart Grid benefit, while some 
elements can provide benefits for more than one Smart Grid objective in ways 
that often impact each other. 
 The active role of customers is essential for capturing the benefits of many Smart 
Grid solutions. Especially at this early stage of the Smart Grid development, 
consumers' participation and response are still uncertain and relevant behavioural 
information (e.g. load profiles) is often not (yet) accessible to utility companies. 
The JRC and ACEA - one of Italy’s biggest DSOs, in charge of managing the MV/LV 
grid of Rome - teamed up to consolidate the evaluation of Smart Grids solutions as a 
viable investment for distribution operators. ACEA and the JRC signed a specific 
Letter of Intents on this topic back in 2012, and have since worked together to study 
the opportunity to scale up a Smart Grid from a pilot project to the dimension of a 
big city like Rome, with more than four million inhabitants. 
ACEA was selected as the perfect case study for many concurrent reasons: the 
"Malagrotta" project, named after the area where the pilot solutions were first 
realised, features many of the characteristics of innovative and comprehensive Smart 
Grids projects: it entails automation, monitoring, and remote control of the different 
sections and different voltage levels of the distribution grid, adding also more 
innovative features like storage and electric vehicles. The project has been realised 
on a grid linking several generation facilities, like biogas, waste and PV plants, and 
supplying refineries and other important consumption centres. 
The project is at the same time innovative and of considerable dimensions, and has 
been selected by the National Regulatory Authority of Italy (AEEGSI) as one of the 
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eight Smart Grids projects benefiting from a premium remuneration of the capital 
invested, thanks to specific characteristics of potential benefits and scalability1. 
 
1.1. Goals of the report 
The goals of this report are: 
 to confirm the robustness of the JRC cost benefit analysis methodology for a 
concrete evaluation of financial and economic impacts of Smart Grid projects, and 
to illustrate its application on ACEA's Malagrotta Smart Grid project; 
 to apply the methodology for the first time to an entire MV/LV distribution grid, 
providing recommendations for the evaluation of Smart Grid scalability options, 
through the assessment of the expected expansion of the Smart Grids solutions 
(tested in Malagrotta project) to the distribution grid serving the whole city of 
Rome. 
 to provide evidence on how ACEA's Smart Grids investment decisions included 
into the 2014-2018 business plan can maximise benefits, when scalability to the 
city level is implemented. 
 
1.2.  European overview of Smart Grid projects 
A smart electricity grid opens the door to new applications with far-reaching impacts: 
providing the capacity to safely integrate more renewable energy sources (RES), 
electric vehicles and distributed generators into the network; delivering power more 
efficiently and reliably through demand response and comprehensive control and 
monitoring capabilities; using automatic grid reconfiguration to prevent or restore 
                                                        
1
 AEEGSI (2011). 
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outages (self-healing capabilities); enabling consumers to have greater control over 
their electricity consumption and to actively participate in the electricity market. 
All these capabilities are being tested in Smart Grid pilot projects around the world, 
shedding light on how to move forward in the transition towards the electricity 
system of the future. A significant number of such projects are situated within the EU, 
making the EU probably the world’s most active area for Smart Grid testing and 
development. 
Spread across the 28 EU member countries, at the moment there are in Europe 459 
different projects, divided between R&D and Demo & Deployment. About 63% of 
these projects are only developed in a single country, certifying the importance of 
individual players in the phase of testing and development of new solutions for the 
generation and distribution of electrical energy. 
   
Figure 1: Overview of Smart Grid sites in Europe and Italy 
Cities such as Paris (FR), London (UK) and Rome (IT) show a high concentration of 
projects and investments in Smart Grids, with total allocated resources that 
overcome €100 million. Investments mainly focus on applications like the integration 
of distributed generation into the grid, as well as the integration of large scale RES, 
and smart network management, with the goal of improving the observability and 
controllability of the network through substation automation, grid monitoring and 
remote grid control. 
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Within this vivid EU-wide urban development of advanced solutions for electricity 
networks, ACEA started in 2011 a Smart Grid pilot project in Malagrotta, Rome, 
focusing on distribution and automation of the MV/LV network. The aim is to 
quantify the benefits of the operated improvements to the grid, and to eventually 
extend the project to the entire area of Rome. The main areas of intervention, as well 
as the issues connected to the project, are described in the following chapters. 
1.3. Description of the Malagrotta project 
The goal of ACEA’s pilot project is to set up a prototype of real Smart Grid which may 
be replicated over the whole of Rome’s electricity network, in order to accommodate 
a prospectively increasing flow of Distributed Generation (DG) injected into the 
system, while keeping stable or even improving the quality of distribution service. DG 
is known to raise a number of issues to be addressed for electricity grids, such as: 
 Capacity of cables, conductors and equipment; 
 Short circuit power levels of the grid; 
 Slow or rapid voltage variations; 
 Variations of other voltage quality parameter (harmonics, symmetry); 
 Reverse power flow at HV/MV transformers or at single MV lines; 
 Unwanted islanding. 
However, some advantageous opportunities may arise from DG, including: 
 Voltage stability improvement at some nodes; 
 Reduction of energy losses in the lines; 
 Improvement of continuity of supply; 
 Postponement of grid development or substitution interventions. 
Such features pose new challenges to grid management, which need to be met 
through improvements in remote monitoring, diagnostics and automation. 
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ACEA's Malagrotta pilot project started in January 2011, with the involvement of local 
and international electricity suppliers. The planned installation activities have been 
concluded in December 2013, while monitoring and data gathering of the entire 
project went on until December 2014. The installations involve an electricity grid 
already operational in the Malagrotta-Ponte Galeria area, which includes two primary 
substations (Raffinerie and Ponte Galeria), 76 secondary substations, 69.5 km in MV, 
four electricity generation plants, six users connected to the MV grid and 1,200 
consumers to the LV grid. 
     
Figure 2: High Voltage switch and High Voltage disconnector at the primary  
substation Raffinerie   
 
The project addresses three main areas of intervention, or sub-projects: 
1) Advanced MV-grid automation; 
2) Monitoring and Remote Control of MV/LV grid; 
3) New management criteria of MV grid. 
It is very important to note that the three sub-projects are additive, therefore it 
would not make sense to realise e.g. sub-project 2 without having realised sub-
project 1: they represent 3 subsequent phases of a unique project, which has been 
divided into three chunks in order to evaluate more carefully each one's contribution 
in recovering the initial investment. Realising e.g. sub-project 2 without having 
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realised sub-project 1 would not make sense for ACEA, as many benefits stemming 
from this project (as for most Smart Grids projects, as previously mentioned) can be 
reaped only if the complete Smart Grid system is set up. 
The sub-projects on Automation (1) and Monitoring (2) represent the development 
of innovative solutions at the peripheral level. Specifically, the advanced automation 
of the grid has entailed the creation of three alternative solutions for the automatic 
identification of the grid segment where a failure takes place: SLP (Selettività Logica 
Palindroma, “palindromic logical selectivity”), chronometric selectivity, and fast FRG 
(Funzione Rivelatore di Guasto, “fault detection function”)2.  
The first involves the installation of distributed intelligence on the nodes, and their 
mutual connection through a low latency radio signal (HiperLAN), in order to obtain 
the selection of the failed segment in an interval of hundreds of milliseconds.  
The other two, instead, involve the installation of distributed intelligence on 
autonomously operating nodes, with a longer overall response time (in the order of 
seconds). This approach, however, is easier to replicate on a larger scale, and 
operatively more stable. 
 
Figure 3: Medium voltage switchgear installed at ACEA's test field, with instruments 
for the selection of MV lines failed segments 
                                                        
2
 More details on the technical aspects of the project may be found in ACEA (2013) (in Italian). 
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The sub-project on Monitoring of MV and LV grids has prompted the development 
and the installation of a solution for real-time measurement of electric and 
environmental variables directly at the secondary substation, and for their 
transmission to the central information system, both through the public network 
(GSM/GPRS) and a through dedicated private line (TETRA). 
A solution for the remote control of LV grid switches was also developed considering 
two approaches: one involved the substitution of the existing switch, while the other 
only required its upgrade (it is worth remarking that the distribution grid of Rome 
includes more than 60,000 LV switches).  
After the completion of the project, all this equipment allows to continuously 
monitor and remote-control the LV grid. So far, this has only been done through on-
site interventions prompted by direct customer request. 
 
Figure 4: a) HiperLAN and Tetra equipment installed on a secondary substation of the 
pilot project; b) detail of the HiperLAN antenna; c) TETRA coverage of the project area 
The sub-project on New Management Criteria for MV grids (3) represents a first step 
towards the development of a stronger central information system, with several more 
control options than the existing one. The project implied the development of an 
algorithm, resident in the SCADA system of ACEA, which models the electric state of 
the entire grid through data coming from the MV grid nodes and establishes the 
optimal set points to be sent to on-site operative equipment (devices for voltage 
variation on MV lines, distributed generators on MV). Electricity losses can thus be 
minimised, while respecting the predefined conditions on voltage profiles. 
a) b) c) 
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The Smart Grid project has resulted on the development of innovative solutions at 
the peripheral grid level (Advanced automation of MV grid and Monitoring and 
Remote Control of LV grid), which are replicable on a large scale for the entire grid 
owned by ACEA. 
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2. Cost Benefit Analyses for a SG in the city of Rome: methods and 
results 
2.1. The JRC CBA methodology for Smart Grids projects 
The aim of the CBA methodology described in the Guidelines (JRC 2012) was to 
define a way to include also socio-economic impacts of Smart Grid projects into the 
evaluation, thus not limiting the analysis to financial costs and benefits incurred by 
the actor(s) implementing the Smart Grid project. The JRC therefore aims to analyse 
projects from a societal perspective, considering each project’s impact on the entire 
value chain and on society at large.  
The proposed approach also recognises that the impact of each Smart Grid project 
goes beyond what can be captured in monetary terms, and therefore the CBA 
economic analysis (monetary appraisal of costs and benefits on behalf of society) 
may be complemented with qualitative impact analyses (non-monetary appraisal of 
non-quantifiable impacts and externalities, e.g. social impacts, contribution to policy 
goals) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), capturing only the specific technical 
aspects affected by the implementation of the selected Smart Grid project. 
The economic analysis takes into account all costs and benefits that can be 
expressed in monetary terms, considering a societal perspective. In other words, the 
analysis tries to include all costs and benefits that spill over from the Smart Grid 
project into the electricity system at large (e.g. enabling the future integration of 
distributed energy resources, impact on electricity prices and tariffs, etc.) and into 
society at large (e.g. environmental costs).  
The JRC's approach to CBA comprises three main parts: 
a. Defining the boundary conditions, i.e. the parameters defining the context 
underlying the realisation of the project (e.g. demand growth forecast, discount 
rate, local grid characteristics) and the implementation choices (e.g. roll-out time, 
chosen functionalities); 
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b. Identifying costs and benefits accruing from the project over the chosen time 
lapse, discounting them and summing them up to obtain an NPV; 
c. Performing a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the CBA outcome, when 
subject to variations in the key variables/parameters set in step a. 
 
Define boundary conditions and set parameters 
Perform cost-benefit analysis 
Perform sensitivity analysis 
Present results of the CBA 
and indicate the range of parameter values enabling a positive outcome 
  
Figure 5: Cost-benefit analysis framework 
The methodology (JRC, 2012) also provides guidance on the identification of those 
externalities and social impacts that can result from the implementation of Smart 
Grid projects but cannot be easily monetised and factored into the cost-benefit 
computation.  
As mentioned, the economic appraisal needs to be integrated with both a qualitative 
impact analysis to assess externalities that are not quantifiable in monetary terms 
and Key Performance Indicators to include technical impacts that would be otherwise 
difficult to monetise. These include the costs and the benefits derived from broader 
social impacts like security of supply, consumer participation and improvements in 
market functioning. 
Analysing the Malagrotta project and its scalability options to the broader Rome-
wide network, the main monetised societal impacts are related to improvement in 
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terms of avoided CO2 emissions thanks to a more efficient integration of RES into the 
distribution grid. 
Of course, many other positive impacts can be recognised for the society as a whole, 
such as improvements in health conditions of Rome’s citizens, or environmental 
benefits deriving from the deployment of electric vehicles, among others. However, 
in this analysis such benefits are only discussed at a qualitative level, while the 
monetisation of impacts relies on clearly quantifiable items, such as the market price 
of CO2 emissions in the European Trading System (ETS).  
2.1.1. Economic analysis ― monetary appraisal  
The goal of the economic analysis is to identify the range of parameter values 
enabling a positive outcome of the CBA, and to define actions useful to keep these 
variables in that range. The indicators for such analysis include: 
 economic net present value (NPV) ― the difference between the 
discounted social benefits and costs; 
 economic internal rate of return (IRR) ― the discount rate that produces a 
zero value for the NPV; 
 B/C ratio, i.e. the ratio between discounted economic benefits and costs. 
As stated above, the goal of this analysis is to provide an assessment of the Smart 
Grid project of the city of Rome from the point of view of society. This does 
obviously not replace, but instead encompasses the assessment of the investment 
from the perspective of a private investor.  
Therefore, in the CBA discussed in chapter 2 we first perform an evaluation from the 
latter’s viewpoint, to subsequently add our estimates of the monetised societal 
benefits and costs. This will be first applied to the data pertaining to the Malagrotta 
pilot project, and then extended to the projected investments involving the whole 
city of Rome, based on their expected costs and benefits. Both analyses, however, 
require assumptions on a set of values, which the next section proceeds to spell out.  
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2.2. Assumptions on specific values 
Cost-Benefit Analyses make use of a number of parameters, whose assumed values 
are critical to the accuracy and meaningfulness of the results. We proceed here to 
argue for our choices for such values. 
2.2.1. Discount rate  
The discount rate takes into account the time value of money (the idea that the 
money available now is worth more than the same amount of money available in the 
future because it could be earning interest) and the risk or uncertainty of anticipated 
future cash flows (which may be less than expected). 
The discount rate typically has a significant impact on the assessment of the Smart 
Grid project. This is because (1) investment costs are incurred predominantly at the 
beginning of the scenario and are typically infrastructure-related costs – defined as 
"sunk" as they cannot be recovered after being incurred – while (2) Smart Grid 
interventions often provide benefits only in the long run. Two different interest rates 
are used in calculating NPVs: the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for the 
private investor's CBA, and the social discount rate for the societal CBA. 
The rationale for choosing a public policy discount rate is to recognise the societal 
value of Smart Grid investments, the impacts of which go beyond project developers 
and affect a wide range of stakeholders and society at large. 
Discounting costs and benefits at this social discount rate would provide the value 
that the project gives to society, regardless of the actual costs of raising funds for the 
project. For example, in most countries where weighted average cost of capital for 
utilities is higher than the societal discount rate, the cost of remuneration of this new 
investment (rate of return over an increased remunerated asset base) and variations 
in operational costs impacting the regulated tariff may be included as an additional 
cost of the project in the CBA. 
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While discussing the proper way to impute values for the social discount rate (SDR) 
for CBA's, EC (2008) expresses the view that “consensus is growing around the social 
time preference rate (STPR) approach. This approach is based on the long term rate 
of growth in the economy and considers the preference for benefits over time, taking 
into account the expectation of increased income, or consumption, or public 
expenditure.”3 An approximate formula flowing from this approach is the following: 
r = eg + p 
where r is the real social discount rate of public funds expressed in an appropriate 
currency (e.g. Euro); g is the growth rate of public expenditure; e is the elasticity of 
marginal social welfare with respect to public expenditure, and p is a rate of pure 
time preference (STPR)4. 
The official guidelines for CBA have long suggested a SDR value of 5%. This was 
originally proposed by the Conference of the Presidents of Regions and Autonomous 
Provinces in a document of 20015, which is still the reference for the Italian Regions’ 
feasibility studies6 and was adopted by the Italian Economic Ministry and the EC 
(2002, p. 104)7. However, as noted by Percoco (2008), this rate “does not have any 
background empirical analysis, nor has it any strong supportive argument”. 
Therefore, in order to choose an appropriate social discount rate for this analysis, 
one should further consider that expectations on Italy's economic growth rate (g) 
                                                        
3
 The theoretical superiority of STPR is also claimed by Evans (2006, p. 3), quoting policy (HM Treasury, 
1997) and academic (Spackman, 2004) papers. In short, the rationale for taking into account the expected 
GDP growth rate is its presumable positive impact on consumption. Based on standard economic theory, 
if I expect to consume more in the future, the additional SG benefits will be given a lower value than if I 
have less positive expectations. This is as much as saying that high (consumption) growth expectations 
determine high discount rates, and vice versa. 
4
     The algebra for this equation is set out in Feldstein (1965). 
5
 Conferenza dei Presidenti delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome (2001, 2003).  
6
  Cf. f.i. the regulation of the Regional Project Assessment Group of Tuscany (Regione Toscana, 2013).  
7
  EC (2002). 
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have deteriorated in recent years, and this should be mirrored in SDR. Indeed, even 
the pre-crisis estimates of EC (2006)8 - i.e. DG REGIO’s CBA guidelines - suggested a 
lower value of 3.5% for Italy's SDR. This document is the methodological reference of 
EC (2008), where 3.3% is suggested as a value of reference for Italy; nevertheless, 
each member state is exhorted to assess its own SDR. These figures are quite in line 
with Evans (2006) (who argued that a rate close to 3% was defendable as a European 
benchmark), and with Percoco’s (2008) own estimate of 3.69-3.83% (which depends 
on usage of the 1980-2004 average of real GDP growth rates, equalling 2.1%). SDR 
values are further lowered in Florio and Sirtori (2013), who estimate an appalling 
1.13%, flowing from their assumption of 0.1% yearly GDP growth (based on a long-
run average of 2000-2018 data and forecasts).  
Considering the time frame of our period of interest, it is our opinion that the 1980-
2004 mean value for g could not pertinently represent the current and future 
situation. On the other hand, estimates based on 2000-2018 rates seem excessively 
tied to global and Euro crisis circumstances to be extended all the way to 2029. While 
gauging current growth expectations, moreover, the plain application of values 
relative to past performances seems rather unwarranted, except of course to the 
extent that – in people’s minds – the latter concur to shape the former. 
It seems that a better approach is to refer to long-term growth forecasts for Italy by 
international economic institutions, as an element to feed into computations of STPR. 
On this regard, IMF forecasts9 are 0.9% for 2015 and 1.1% for 2019, while the OECD10 
estimates an average of 1.5% for the 2014-2030 period, and Banco de España (2012, 
p. 18) imputes a value of 1.4% for 2012-2021 and 1.1% for 2022-2031.  
                                                        
8
 EC (2006). 
9
 IMF (2014, p. 181). 
10 OECD (2014, p. 224). 
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On such basis, conservative estimates of current expectations on 2014-2029 growth 
rates may hover around 1%. Combined with the most recent values of 1.5 for e and 
0.98 for p (from Florio and Sirtori, 2013), this gives a figure of 2.48%. Therefore, we 
conclude that a working assumption for Italy’s present-day real SDR is 2.5%. 
The JRC methodology strongly recommends that discount rates be subjected to a 
sensitivity analysis. Based on the above discussion, the 1%-5% range looks like an 
appropriate choice for it, as it runs the full gamut from a zero growth scenario to the 
Italian local authorities’ official SDR value. 
The Financial Discount Rate (FDR) (the discount rate to consider while assessing the 
project’s viability from the point of view of a private investor), is derived from the fact 
that ACEA is a state-controlled enterprise with private stakeholders’ participation, 
and that it is a listed company issuing its own debt. The FDR represents opportunity 
cost of capital and is valued as the loss of income from an alternative investment 
with a similar risk profile.  
Different methods exist to estimate its value: a commonly used approach is by means 
of a weighted average between the cost of debt and the cost of equity (WACC), 
another focuses on the return lost from the best alternative investment and does not 
consider buying back public or private debt, but instead analyses the return on an 
appropriate portfolio of financial assets. Following this second approach, a study 
from the European Commission (2014b, p. 288) indicated 5.1% as a pertinent 
estimation for the nominal FDR, with a long term inflation rate of 2.2%. As will be 
explained in the following sections, the choice made in this analysis for the inflation 
rate has been 2%, which led to a correction of the FDR to the value of 5% in nominal 
rates (3% in real rates). 
A further possible choice for the nominal FDR, which emerged from discussion with 
ACEA experts, is based on the cost of capital of the company, currently hovering 
around 6%. Yet another one is provided in Cosentino et al. (2011, p. 3), where the 
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conducted CBA is based on a nominal rate of 5.5%, which is assumed as “a suitable 
trade-off between the financial and the social discount rates” (and seems to imply a 
nominal FDR even higher than that value). Also, in order to explore the consequences 
of such choices, the real Financial Discount Rate was subjected to sensitivity analysis 
on the rather encompassing 0%-8% range. 
Be it noted that discount rates impact the NPV in a negative way. Therefore, rates of 
GDP growth (hence SDR) – or rates of return on invested capital – collapsing to 
unpredictable lows would only make any benefits flowing from present investments 
even more valuable at a certain future date. 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Time horizon of the CBA 
The choice of an appropriate time horizon significantly affects the results of any CBA, 
therefore it is a crucial parameter to be set. Smart Grids, like other infrastructural 
projects, are typically characterised by substantial initial investments, bringing 
benefits which are delayed in the future w.r.t. the investments themselves. Most of 
the times, then, appropriately setting the time horizon involves an assumption on 
how long the benefits flowing from the intervention will accrue in the future, an 
aspect clearly affected by a substantial amount of uncertainty. Potential sources of 
uncertainty in defining the time horizon for Smart Grid projects are e.g. the 
regulatory framework, project ownership, and other changes in the market setting. 
The first investment figures included in our analysis date back to 2011, when ACEA 
started the realisation of the Malagrotta project. However, as the analysis has been 
Real discount rate for private investor's CBA: 3% 
Real discount rate for societal CBA: 2.5% 
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carried out in 2014 after the completion of Malagrotta's infrastructural interventions, 
all monetary flows have been discounted back (or forward) to 2014 (i.e. the results 
are expressed in Euros of our reference year 2014). 
For ACEA's Malagrotta project and its scalability to Rome's distribution network, 
several options have been considered: 
 Adopting a time horizon of five years, consistent with ACEA's strategic plan 
2014-2018. This solution would help shed light on the returns on the 
investments included in the strategic plan, considering it as a one-off outlay. It 
would also imply a judgment on the plan itself, identifying whether planned 
investments are worthwhile in the short run. However, such a choice would 
not take into account a rather important chunk of benefits that will be earned 
after 2018, due to the planned timeline of interventions. In particular, the 
realisation of sub-project 3 (set-up of New Management Criteria for the MV 
grid) is expected to yield its full benefits only from 2019 onwards. Therefore, 
such an evaluation would completely miss out on the effects of an important 
part of the SG’s planned extension to the whole of Rome's network, and has 
therefore not been selected for this analysis.  
 Adopt a time horizon of twelve years, as specified in the specific regulatory 
provisions concerning investments in Smart Grids, set by the Italian NRA in its 
integrated text concerning rules on transmission, distribution and metering of 
electricity (TIT 2007). In fact, the provisions set a remuneration of 2% over 
twelve years for Smart Grid projects, in addition to the above-mentioned 
baseline remuneration rate for standard electricity infrastructure. However, the 
TIT is subject to revision at the end of every regulatory period (in Italy four 
years) and this remuneration rate has been changed in order to adapt it to the 
changing business environment. 
 Adopting a time horizon period of fifteen years from 2014 (or 19 from the 
very first initial investment in Malagrotta's project), up to 2029. The 
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concession regime on the distribution network of Rome will in fact undergo 
profound changes after this period, indicating the suitability of this time 
horizon as the one for the analysis of ACEA's investment decisions. This choice 
privileges a long-term horizon, which seems to be the most appropriate when 
dealing with regulated activities and companies. In fact, every business 
decision taken at ACEA today will have an effect on its future 
strategic/business plans, at least until ACEA is the company entitled by law to 
run the distribution network and upgrade it. 
Of the three options considered, the one extended to the period of fifteen years, 
until 2029, was chosen for this analysis. As mentioned, this period seems more 
suitable because it covers a longer time horizon, and takes into account possible 
regulatory changes in the concession regime after 2029. 
 
2.2.3. Macroeconomic factors 
Factors such as the inflation rate or the social value of avoiding the emission of a ton 
of CO2 need to be taken into account in order to make estimates as accurate as 
possible. We will discuss here our concerning assumptions in turn. 
The choice of the carbon price is possibly the single hardest decision in a Smart Grid 
CBA. Unlike other externalities (such as PM10), EU CO2 emission permits have been 
traded on a dedicated market for some years now, and the social value of avoided 
emissions is therefore not anymore the mere object of theorising. 
Unfortunately, however, this fact does not per se make the issue any less tricky. As for 
any other market price, long-run forecasting has its own difficulties; furthermore, this 
is an artificial market (i.e. a market for a state-made commodity such as a legal 
authorisation), so that the usual uncertainties connected with purely economic 
Time horizon of CBA: 19 years (2011 - 2029) 
Reference year for discounting: 2014 
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factors are compounded by the ones deriving from predicting, years in advance, 
possible further actions taken, among others, by the European Parliament. On the 
other hand, monetisation of avoided emissions through carbon market prices can 
only document what costs must not be borne by fossil-fuel generators thanks to 
Smart Grids; but, what Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) are actually meant for is 
making polluters pay the actual social marginal cost of a certain productive activity. 
What should be considered for the societal assessment of a project is clearly the 
latter, with its possible variability in time. 
Due to how Pigouvian taxes are established and maintained in the real world, 
however, this notional cost may or may not be exactly reflected in carbon market 
prices at any given point in time. In fact, a large consensus holds that the current 
quotation of CO2 at ca. 6 €/ton, largely due to a recession-related allowances glut, is 
alarmingly low and radically disconnected from the fundamental social cost of 
carbon - to the point of triggering widespread commentary on the “failure” of the EU 
ETS. In any case, such values are very distant from what is envisaged in the European 
Commission’s “roadmap to a competitive low-carbon economy” (EC 2011), requiring 
(in the baseline scenario) carbon prices of 16.5, 20 and 36 €/ton resp. by 2020, 2025 
and 203011. And indeed, the evident departure of the current values from the 
political goals of the EU has recently set off a clear shift in the policies concerned. A 
scheme for postponing the coming years’ auctions, hence effectively curtailing 
supply of European Unit Allowances by 900 million units (the so-called 
“backloading”) was approved in early 2014. Furthermore, the EC has proposed a 
Market Stabilisation Reserve Mechanism involving controlled injection of backloaded 
EUA’s in order to stabilise their prices above €20-30. Such policy decisions are 
expected to mark a structural break in the years ahead, driving prices quite 
dramatically away from the current lows. 
                                                        
11
 Cf. EC (2011, p. 117), Annex 7.10, table 31. 
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In this complex situation, one may be tempted to go to extremes and conclude that 
carbon market prices should be simply swept aside, in favour of a conceptual 
framework able to assess the “real” social costs. In practice, however, such a shared 
conceptual framework is hardly at hand by now. For all the difficulties that we have 
just seen, then, carbon market prices may still be the best guide to the near future 
that we have got, if one is willing to concede that the political decision system may 
do at least a decent job in the years to come. In this report, hence, CO2 values will 
still be monetised based on ETS forecasts, addressing these well-founded worries 
through sensitivity analysis. In such an uncertain environment, it is reassuring to find 
that - as will be seen below - the Net Present Value of the project at hand is largely 
above zero for any relevant choice of carbon dioxide’s monetary value; in particular, 
for any choice above current ETS prices. 
Focussing on backloading alone, a recent EC document (EC 2014, p. 39) lists a series 
of analyses: Barclays predicts an ETS price of 10 €/ton in 2020 for the 900-mln 
backloading scenario, while Thomson Reuters’ estimate is 8 €/ton. Already at the 
shorter 2015 horizon, Bloomberg sees prices going up to 20 €/ton; Tschach 
Solutions’ take is 23.5 €/ton. Further estimates are in Carraro and Favero (2009) 
(about 45 €/ton in 2020 in the mean scenario), Thomas (2008) (25 €/ton in 2020), 
Thomson Reuters (2011) (average price in 2013-2020 at 22 €/ton), Weisbach (2011) 
(ca. 20-22 €/ton in the 2013-2020 period), and Chen (2012) (21.7 €/ton in 2020 in the 
average scenario).  
The Market Stabilisation Reserve mechanism would change the game quite a bit, 
with Thomson Reuters most recently predicting an average 2021-2030 price of 23 
€/ton12, and Energy Aspects seeing prices averaging 45 €/ton over the period 2017 
to 2030 with MSR starting in 2017, and 31 €/ton if it starts in 202113. 
                                                        
12
 Hill (2014). 
13
 Sikorsky (2014). 
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It was decided here to privilege simplicity and conservatism, employing the relatively 
low value of 15 €/ton as a baseline working assumption, as a rough average of the 
Nomisma Energia14 and CEPS-Thomson Reuters15 reference-scenario forecasts up to 
2030. For the sensitivity analysis, values considered range from the current low of 5 
€/ton to 50 €/ton, the figure generally topping the market analyses that we have just 
listed, as well as the EC’s forecasts on ETS that were mentioned above. At any rate, let 
us repeat that NPVs for Rome are largely above zero for any meaningful choice of 
carbon prices. 
A further aspect to consider is inflation. Investment deployment obviously involves 
time-varying costs in terms of operational capital and labour. A value of 2% was 
assumed as an estimate of the average expectation of growth rate of such costs, in 
line with the ECB’s inflation target. This implied a slight correction of the 
aforementioned 5.1% nominal FDR suggested in EC (2014b), based on a 2.2% 
inflation forecast, due to the fact that current expectations do not suggest Italian 
inflation may overshoot the ECB target in the relevant horizon.  
 
2.2.4. Electricity demand 
Demand for electricity depends on the development of other factors, such as 
population growth, domestic consumption, non-domestic consumption, electricity 
losses. Naturally, it is necessary to base the choice of the electricity demand or the 
demand growth on country-specific forecasts. 
                                                        
14 Nomisma Energia – Mercato ETS (2014). 
15 Thomson Reuters Point Carbon (2014).
 
EU CO2 Allowance price: 15 €/ton 
Average inflation rate per year: 2% 
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Electricity price developments should also be taken into account. Since electricity 
savings are typically one of the most significant benefits resulting from the 
implementation of smart meters - e.g. KEMA (2010) -, an increase in the electricity 
price would result in a potentially higher monetary benefit in terms of electricity 
savings. 
In this specific context, evolution of electricity demand will significantly affect the 
impact of future extensions of the pilot project to the whole city grid, involving 
benefits stretching into the future and investments to be performed throughout 
2019. Demand forecasts for Central Italy by the Italian TSO TERNA (2013) impute a 
2013-2023 average expected electricity demand yearly growth rate of 1.2% for the 
“development” scenario, and of 0.4% for the baseline (i.e. low growth) scenario. 
Considering the recent brisker dynamics of Rome's GDP per capita growth w.r.t. the 
rest of Central Italy, judgment suggested to assume a figure somewhat above the 
average between the two, i.e. 1%. 
Electricity demand obviously has a large impact on the outcome of the CBA. Conform 
to the JRC guidelines, it was therefore subject to a sensitivity analysis on the -1% to 
2% range.  
 
2.2.5. Emission factors 
Smart Grid projects typically result in energy savings (e.g. due to reduction of 
electricity losses) or favourable changes in the generation mix thanks to increased 
DG hosting capacity. The context-specific coefficient that translates a unit generation 
decrease into the corresponding amount of avoided greenhouse gas emissions is the 
emission factor (EF). The Covenant of Mayors - an association of Europe's urban 
areas of which Rome has been a signatory since 2009 - provides its members with 
country-specific EF's for computations related to its programmes, calculated based 
Yearly rate of growth of electricity demand: 1% 
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on both the “classical” and Life-Cycle Assessment16 methodology. It was decided to 
adopt Italy's LCA EF from the Covenant of Mayors17, equal to 0.708 ton CO2-
eq/MWhe, as the value used in this analysis. Note that this also implies the 
assumption that the impact of project-related increases in RES electricity generation 
within ACEA's jurisdiction on the country-wide energy mix is negligible. This value 
was subjected to sensitivity analysis on the 0.5-0.95 range. 
 
 
 
2.2.6. Dynamics and uncertainty of costs and benefits 
As ACEA carried out detailed analyses in order to estimate a monetisation for the 
benefits, the underlying hypotheses supporting their calculation are described below. 
Various damaging events affect the grid over time, implying costs as high as the 
impact connected to the events. In order to reduce said costs, a series of investments 
planned on an annual base are operated. The main goal of the methodology is to 
give, for any operation on the grid, the expected value of total benefits (avoided 
costs), comprised of the margin of error in the evaluation. Operations are 
characterised by a unitary cost and a benefit, defined as the reduction of the total 
risk connected to each intervention (avoided cost). The benefit is then replicated in 
the years, and actualised taking into account its degradation. The sorting of all 
possible interventions on each element of the grid, using their cost-benefit ratio as a 
                                                        
16
 The Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) methodology takes into account all emissions caused by a technology over 
the whole of its life-cycle, i.e. including installation and decommissioning. By way of example, classical EF’s for 
PV panels are very close to zero, while this does not hold for LCA EF. 
17
 The Covenant of Mayors is a local authority association for the promotion of sustainable policies, of which 
the municipality of Rome has been a signatory since 18
th
 June 2009. 
Emission factor: 0.708 ton CO2-eq/MWhe 
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criterion, defines the optimal plan for operations to be executed. The cumulative 
benefit curve connected to such order of operation allows for an informed choice of 
the percentage of grid to operate investments on, according to the desired 
percentage of total benefit to achieve. 
As a consequence, the following two assumptions were considered appropriate and 
feasible to reflect the uncertainty of the estimates, while at the same time being 
sufficiently conservative: 
 Error margin: all monetised benefits are reduced by a 3% rate to 
account for uncertainty in benefit monetisation due to the underlying 
technical metrics; 
 Benefit decrease: an average rate of annual decrease of 5% for benefits 
related to physical infrastructure (e.g. reclosers) and of 1% for benefits 
related to software (e.g. algorithms). 
As regards monetisation uncertainty, the full span from a 5% decrease to a 2% 
increase in benefits w.r.t. the values reported by ACEA is explored. The hypothesised 
technical yearly reduction rates in benefits related to physical infrastructures and 
software are instead subjected to test resp. in the 2%-8% and 0%-6% ranges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error margin in evaluating benefits: 3% 
Yearly average decrease of benefits:  
 5% for infrastructure 
 1% for software 
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Parameter [UNIT] Value Reference 
Time Horizon years 15 - 19 ACEA 
Real Financial Discount Rate (FDR) %/year 3% 
EC, literature and 
own assessment 
Real Social Discount Rate (SDR) %/year 2.5% 
EC, literature and 
own assessment 
Inflation rate %/year 2% ECB inflation target 
Average uncertainty in 
monetisation of benefits 
% 3% ACEA 
Average rate of decrease of 
benefits related to investments in 
infrastructure 
%/year 5% ACEA 
Average rate of decrease of 
benefits related to investments in 
software 
%/year 1% ACEA 
Average rate of electricity demand 
increase 
%/year 1% 
TERNA and own 
assessment 
Emission factor 
ton CO2-
eq/MWhe 
0.708 
Covenant of 
Mayors 
1 ton CO2-equivalent average 
price in EU ETS 
€ 15 
EC, literature and 
own assessment 
 
Table 3: Values of CBA parameters 
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2.3. CBA for Malagrotta and its extension to Rome 
The JRC methodology described above has been developed to be flexible enough to 
be applied to any Smart Grid project. Since its publication in 2012, it has been refined 
and applied to several projects and EU policies, e.g.: 
 the selection of Projects of Common Interest in the fields of Smart Grids, 
according to Regulation 347/2013 for Trans-European energy infrastructure18;  
 the assessment of national Cost Benefit Analyses for the roll-out of smart 
metering in EU Member States, according to the provisions of Directive 
72/2009 on the functioning of the internal electricity market and of the 
Commission recommendation on preparations for the roll-out of smart 
metering systems [C/2012/1342]19. 
The methodology, however, has been designed not only to support the European 
Commission's policy processes, but first of all to provide a flexible tool for investors, 
project promoters and all other stakeholders to identify the impact of specific Smart 
Grid projects. For this reason, one of the JRC's main research efforts is to test the 
methodology on real Smart Grid projects: the cooperation between ACEA and the 
JRC has been crucial in applying the methodology to Malagrotta and then to its 
scalability to the distribution network of the city of Rome. 
In section 2.3.1 and following ones, we will proceed to a step-by-step description of 
the methodology’s application to the project at hand. Next, in sections 2.3.8 and 
2.3.9, we will present its key results for Malagrotta alone and for its extension to the 
whole city of Rome, first based on the point of view of the individual investor and 
then on that of society as a whole. This aims to answer the following questions: 
                                                        
18
 EC (2013). 
19
 EC(2014). 
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 From the point of view of the investor, is the project financially viable (i.e. 
there is a business case to deploy Smart Grid projects)? This assessment is 
made for both Malagrotta alone and its extension to the whole of Rome’s 
distribution network. 
 What is the effect on the analysis of taking the point of view of a private 
investor and of society as a whole (hence, taking externalities into account)? 
2.3.1. CBA Step 1 – Review and describe the technologies, elements and goals of 
the project 
The following table provides the main feature of ACEA's project in terms of goals and 
engineering features. 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
PROJECT GOAL To demonstrate new telecommunication technologies and 
new criteria of electricity network management are effective 
under real conditions. 
PROJECT SPECIFIC 
OBJECTIVES 
1. Improving system quality and continuity of Rome’s energy 
network through automation systems for fault detection and 
isolation on the MV energy network.  
2. Improving the distribution network observability through 
monitoring and remote control of the low voltage (LV) energy 
flows.  
3. Assessing the positive impact of automation with the new 
grid management criteria.  
START - END DATES CAPEX: 2011 – 2019 / Return on investment: 2015-2029 
FUNDING SCHEME AEEGSI ARG/el 39/10  
LOCATION Rome area (Italy) 
Table 4: Overall description of the ACEA project in Rome 
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MAIN FEATURES PROJECT SMART GRID ROME 
LV CONSUMERS INVOLVED 1.200 ~ 1.600.000 
MV DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 4 ~ 200 
NUMBER OF HV/MV PRIMARY 
SUBSTATIONS 
2 ~ 70 
NUMBER OF MV/LV SECONDARY  
SUBSTATIONS 
76 ~ 13.000 
Table 5: Main features of the project 
 
2.3.2. CBA Step 2 – Map assets into functionalities 
 
The identification of assets into functionalities is provided and quantified by ACEA, 
thanks to their internal expertise. ACEA provided data that have been taken as input 
for this analysis and are detailed in the next paragraphs.  
In doing this process, ACEA developed a "Driver", i.e. a custom-made indicator that is 
the result of a specific model putting in relation, among other variables:  
 the number of MV and LV users,  
 the probability of faults  
 the cost of installing the specific technical solutions tested of each sub-
project, and 
 the reduction in adverse events and the consequential increase in quality of 
electricity of supply, as measured by reductions in duration and number of 
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interruptions in supply 20  (i.e. Smart Grids functionalities that can be 
monetised, according to the current regulatory framework) 
for each of the 1568 grid sections of Rome's distribution network and for each sub-
project. 
2.3.3. CBA Step 3 – Map functionalities onto benefits 
 
Finally, the three "drivers" (one per each sub-project) were expressed into the 
expected monetary benefits of realising the project, such as the decrease in 
compensations owed to consumers for each interruption, the cost of interventions 
on the grid, the avoided investment costs otherwise necessary to comply with 
regulatory design (increasing quality targets for electricity supply at every regulatory 
period), etc. This last step constitutes the mapping of functionalities into benefits. 
It should be noted that this step of the CBA has been crucial in the development of 
the analysis, as usually the same DSOs may find it difficult to clearly identify the 
monetary outcome of investments made over their own grid. Such refined 
calculations not only resulted in a clear indication of monetary benefits, but also, for 
each of the three sub-projects, identified a specific timeline to scale up the project to 
Rome's network, spotlighting those grid sections that bring the most benefits in the 
shortest time and therefore spelling out a clear road-map to deploy the Smart Grid 
project effectively, whilst maximising ACEA's NPV. 
2.3.4. CBA Step 4 – Establish the baseline 
 
The project baseline defines the standard against which the condition resulting from 
the realisation of the Smart Grid project is compared. Typically referred to as 
                                                        
20
 As provided by AEEGSI, in Italy regulatory provisions on quality of electricity supply for each DSO are 
measured by both total duration of interruptions during 1 year (so-called D1) and number of interruptions 
during 1 year (so-called N1 indicator).  
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Business as Usual (BaU), it reflects the condition of the distribution network of 
reference without any Smart Grid intervention, taking only planned maintenance into 
account. 
For the purposes of carrying out this CBA, the overall Smart Grid project was 
analytically divided in the three sub-projects described earlier in Section 1.2. Costs 
and benefits stemming from the project are then assessed comparing those 
associated with a BaU scenario and those that would be incurred in scenarios where 
ACEA implements the three sub-projects (each sub-project separately and then all 
the three together). The robustness of resulting figures has been scrutinised also by 
internal ACEA's expertise, taking into account also historical costs and benefits 
accrued by the company when realising other grid interventions. The involvement of 
DSO internal expertise is in fact crucial in such analysis, as they are the ones directly 
involved in realising the project. 
As an additional note the way baselines and metrics are calculated in practice 
depends upon local conditions and current information availability, as known by the 
DSO. This may have significant impact on the final results and possibly on the 
comparability of different analyses: very unlikely the analyses (and especially 
mapping assets into benefits and then functionalities) performed for this project 
would make sense if just transposed into another Smart Grid project taking place in a 
different regulatory environment, with different technical challenges, etc. DSO' 
involvement is therefore a key asset to correctly identify the context of each project 
and gather the appropriate, first-hand data. 
2.3.5. CBA Step 5 – Monetise the benefits and identify the beneficiaries 
 
Projects can impact at the level of avoided costs or yield other benefits, as reduced 
greenhouse gases emissions, etc. The monetary values of the benefits of the project 
were calculated based on the assumptions on parameters presented in section 2.2 
and considering foreseeable boundary conditions. The perspectives of different 
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stakeholders (e.g. DSOs, residential consumers, society) were assessed by applying 
comparable sets of benefit metrics. The benefits accruing for Malagrotta and for the 
whole of the city of Rome from the three sub-projects were considered for the 
analysis. These include the intrinsic benefits of each sub-project, accruing to ACEA 
from a) the regulated remuneration of invested capital; b) avoided regulatory 
penalties, related to improvements in electricity supply (e.g. shorter interruption 
duration); c) avoided maintenance and intervention costs when grid faults take place. 
These can be broken down into benefits flowing to the DSO due to infrastructure 
items installed in year 1, year 2, year 3, etc., of the project deployment. 
Clearly, the regulator's rationale in establishing such remuneration and penalties was 
to make ACEA internalise part of the customers' welfare gains and losses linked to 
network performance (e.g. via better or worse quality of supply). Under perfect 
competition (and symmetric information), such welfare gains would translate into 
higher perceived service quality, for which consumers may be willing to pay a bit 
more; price externalities would ensue, making for transitory extra-profits for the 
investing firm. The Regulator's aim is to mimic such market dynamics in a natural 
monopoly environment, as a way to incentivise the DSO towards (esp. innovative) 
investments.  
Even if information asymmetry between regulator and DSO is disregarded, however, 
due to the absence of first degree price discrimination, neither price externalities nor 
regulated returns could ever capture the full consumer surplus gains from reduced 
outages. In principle, one may attempt to gauge these directly through some 
measure of project-related improved security of supply monetised via the relevant 
Value Of Lost Load (VOLL). However, the current state of research on the topic is 
such that esp. the latter parameter poses rather daring measurement problems. At 
the present stage, it seems necessary to be content with the rough guide to welfare 
gains represented by regulatory remuneration and avoided penalties, and it was 
therefore decided to include the latter in the Societal CBA, too. The approach seems 
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particularly fit to Rome, where the vast majority of customers are residential, as for 
this category Italian regulators seem to have set incentive rates near the higher end 
of the relevant spectrum21: in other words, due to political priorities, Italian DSOs 
seem to be punished relatively harshly w.r.t. other European ones in case they fail to 
keep domestic lights on. It is fair to suppose, however, that the full amount of social 
surplus may still be underestimated by this procedure (therefore it can be concluded 
that NPV evaluations reported are rather prudential and the welfare gain for the 
society might be higher than what we estimate). 
The DSO is not held legally responsible for force majeure events; however, such 
penalties are subjected to a €5.5 million cap per year, applied to the summation of 
avoided penalties flowing from the sub-projects impacting on reduced outages (i.e., 
MV Automation and LV Monitoring). This may work both as a form of public 
insurance for DSOs (with an excess franchise aimed at preventing moral hazard) and 
as a rough regulatory shortcut to mimic the slope of marginal welfare costs, which is 
likely to be decreasing in longer and more frequent outages22. In both the private-
investor and societal CBA, therefore, benefits from avoided penalties are 
correspondingly curtailed at such cap. Since it is attempted in the following to 
compute IRRs and NPVs from each sub-project independently, and the size ratio (e.g. 
in uncapped NPV terms) of sub-projects 1 and 2 is roughly 1:2, in all further analyses 
fictional €1.8 and €3.7 million caps will be imposed resp. on sub-project 1 and 2. This 
preserves comparability between computed NPV values for the whole project and for 
the different sub-projects.23 
In order to guide investment decisions, however, it is desirable that one may get a 
flavour of the intrinsic structural dynamics of benefits for each sub-project, 
                                                        
21
 Cf. Bertazzi, Fumagalli, and Lo Schiavo (2005, p. 5). 
22
 Cf. ibid., p. 4; also, most recently, Praktiknjo (2014) (for Germany). 
23
 Indeed, the summation of avoided penalties from the sub-projects under such fictional caps is roughly the 
same as the one under the regulatory cap for the whole Smart Grid project. 
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regardless of all superimposed constraints. This can be readily obtained from Figure 
7, where benefit flows for each sub-project and for the aggregate are depicted after 
all regulatory caps are removed. The figure clearly shows that, for Rome, 
interventions on LV monitoring yield much higher benefits than what is the case for 
the other two sub-projects. This result carries over to NPVs (also capped ones, as 
seen in the following, thanks to the properly adjusted fictional caps employed). Thus, 
investments in LV monitoring seem to feature the brightest investment outlook. 
Figure 6: Benefits gained annually for the Malagrotta project 
 
Figure 7: Benefits gained annually for the extension of the project to Rome 
In addition to the above, there are further benefits deriving from avoided GHG 
emissions and from the regulated remuneration of invested capital in the Smart Grids 
projects. While the former is the main positive externality flowing from the project, 
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and is hence specific to the societal analysis, the latter was included in both the 
private-investor and the societal analysis, for the theoretical reasons that were 
explained in this section. 
2.3.6. CBA Step 6 – Financial model – costs identification and quantification 
The costs for Capital Expenditures and Operating Expenditures (CAPEX and OPEX) 
estimated for the implementation of the three sub-projects were considered for 
Malagrotta and for the Rome extension in turn. As recommended in the CBA 
guidelines, replacement costs have been duly considered when occurring at the end 
of each asset’s life time.  
 
 
Figure 8: CAPEX and OPEX for Malagrotta project (a) and for the extension to Rome (b) 
b) 
a) 
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For simplicity, it has been assumed that all the assets are considered to last for the 
economic value of the project (fifteen years) so that there is no problem involving 
calculation of replacement costs and residual value of the replaced asset. In Figure 8 
it is possible to observe the values hypothesised for CAPEX and OPEX throughout the 
years both for the Malagrotta project and for the extension to the entire city of 
Rome. 
The capital expenditures for the sub-projects are expected to be carried out across 
several years, and the same holds for the related benefits. It is important to note here 
that the Automation and Remote Control/Monitoring sub-projects (i.e., sub-projects 
1 and 2) are based on physical assets, which benefits are assumed to accrue with a 
5% yearly decline rate. On the other hand, the New Grid Management Criteria sub-
project is based on the improvement of software algorithms, for which the 
assumption of such a steep decline pace seems unwarranted. It was hence suggested 
that the latter's benefits would flow with a milder decreasing trend of 1% per year. As 
already mentioned, such values were subjected to sensitivity analysis resp. on the 2-
8% and 0-6% range. 
2.3.7. CBA Step 7 – Financial model – Benefits and Free Cash-Flow analysis 
We now proceed to present the monetised benefits, as they are realised for the DSO 
as an individual investor. As earlier mentioned, the ACEA projects were initially 
assessed at a nominal FDR of 5% (i.e. a real FDR of 3%). Taxes have not been taken 
into account, as recommended by the JRC methodology.  
To be noted that these expected benefits may represent both the cash flows realised 
by the potential investor (ACEA) and avoided costs. In the latter case, ACEA foresees 
to avoid costs that are currently sustained as fixed costs, due to the general 
maintenance of the assets. These costs are needed to ensure technological updating 
and efficiency of ACEA’s assets; as such, they will not produce a cash flow directly, 
but will instead allow reducing maintenance costs and avoiding regulatory fees and 
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penalties for under-performance of the electricity distribution service, so to increase 
the availability of cash. 
A further aspect of Italian regulation relevant to the present analysis is the fact that 
ACEA’s network investments receive (via tariffs) a regulated remuneration on 
standard electrical infrastructure; furthermore, investments in Smart Grids earn 
returns which are 2% in excess of such baseline regulatory rate. Being part of ACEA's 
income, this should obviously be included in the private investor CBA.  
Regulated returns on invested capital are calculated on the RAB (regulated asset 
base). This was computed based on accountancy methods for electricity utilities 
prescribed by the current Italian legislation, as spelled out in the relevant documents 
by the Authority for electricity, gas and water services (AEEGSI)24. Namely, net fixed 
assets (measured via historic CAPEX figures and netted of accumulated depreciation, 
based on regulatory useful lives for the relevant investment items) have been 
factored in after the regulatory two-year time lag has lapsed. They are then annually 
updated by the revalued historic cost method, i.e. expressed in current prices 
through a gross fixed cost investment deflator that (according to common regulatory 
practices) was approximated by the inflation rate. RAB is then computed from this 
value by addition of net working capital and subtraction of adjustments for 
severance indemnity (currently parametrically estimated as resp. 1% and 2.17% of 
revalued net fixed assets, as per the aforementioned Regulation)25. As said, the 
Malagrotta pilot project benefits from the Regulatory treatment for Smart grids 
granting an additional 2% for the first twelve years of the investment’s useful life. 
Intuitively, a financial viability analysis can consider both directly accruing benefits 
and avoided costs. An avoided cost can in fact be considered as additional cash 
                                                        
24
 The valid reference for this is AEEGSI (2012). 
25
 Since balance sheet figures for OPEX are available, it was also attempted to assess net working capital from 
them (the accounting approach currently followed for gas utilities), with no significant divergence. 
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being available in the future as a consequence of the decrease of fixed or variable 
costs of the company. The financial model is presented below in form of cash flow 
analysis (CF). 
As it is customary in the financial literature, the financial feasibility of the projects 
were assessed by calculating the Net Present Value (NPV) of the monetised benefits 
expected to be received as a consequence of the ACEA investments made. 
The NPV was calculated as follows: 
  0=t
N
=t
t
t investment
i+
CF
=NPV 
1 1  
where: 
N = number of years for which the cash flow is expected to be received; 
i = interest rate applied representing the opportunity cost of capital. As discussed at 
length above, the private investor analysis adopted an FDR appropriate to the 
present context; 
t = number of years from the moment the investment is fully disbursed by the DSO; 
Investment = the total Capital and Operational Expenditure expected to be sustained 
by the DSO. 
The NPV is an indicator of how much value an investment or project is expected to 
add to a company. If the NPV is a positive value, the project generates positive cash 
inflow at the end of the period considered, or vice versa. 
2.3.8. Private investor CBA - Results 
The crucial CBA outcome for the three Smart Grid projects can be found in the 
overview table below, where the reader may find the Net Present Value and the 
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Internal Rate of Return26 for the Private Investor CBA of the Malagrotta project and 
of its extension to Rome. 
Private investor CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Smart Grid project (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) - K€ 1,262   K€ 35,972 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.23%   16.60% 
 
Table 6: Outcomes of the CBA for the Malagrotta project and its extension to the Rome 
area – Private investor approach (values in K€, base year 2014) 
From the table above, it is immediate to glean what can be deemed the central result 
of the whole JRC analysis: the Malagrotta project would not be financially viable as a 
stand-alone investment plan, but it plays a key trailblazer role for the Smart 
infrastructuring of the whole electricity network of the city of Rome – which is, after 
all, exactly what a pilot project is meant to do. This fact turns out very clearly already 
for the Private investor CBA, and will be - predictably - further reinforced by the 
Societal CBA, as will be seen presently. Moreover, let it be remarked already here that 
the sensitivity analysis will comfortably confirm this result for all relevant parameter 
ranges. 
We can add further detail by briefly presenting the disaggregated results for the 
three sub-projects: 
Private investor CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Automation (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 374   K€ 10,026 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.86%   12.55% 
        
Private investor CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
MV/LV monitoring (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 456   K€ 24,608 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 0.61%   21.17% 
        
                                                        
26
 The Internal Rate of Return for societal analyses was computed on the whole of cash flow representing 
monetised benefits accruing to society, hence including monetised avoided GHG emissions. 
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Private investor CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
New Management Criteria (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 432   K€ 1,406 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.13%   12.28% 
 
Table 7 Outcomes of the CBA for disaggregated sub-projects – Private investor 
approach (values in K€, base year 2014) 
A monetary appraisal of costs and benefits on behalf of society with a related impact 
analysis was therefore estimated, taking into account the plausible social impacts 
derived from the ACEA projects. 
The most likely positive social impacts were identified in the reduction of air 
pollution derived from a more efficient distribution of electricity, which implies a 
decreased electricity generation. In order to translate this likelihood of positive 
impacts into monetary values that may be considered as financial values, three key 
elements of relatively easy estimation are considered. 
The assumption is that the measures implemented by the projects will impact society 
positively in form of avoided carbon emissions and pollution. These societal benefits 
(SB) are calculated through the multiplication of the following factors: 
 MWh of saved generation27 
 Avoided tons of CO2-equivalent per saved MWh 
 Average EUR value of a ton of CO2-eq saved. 
Hence, benefit monetisation is based on the availability of meaningful and reliable 
information substantiating them. By way of example, preliminary evidence based on 
experiments carried out by ACEA on the Malagrotta network28 suggests that the New 
Grid Management Criteria (NGMC) allow for a decrease in network losses from 4.33% 
                                                        
27
 Saved electricity generation is assumed as a consequence of the improvements in the electricity distribution 
due to the investment. 
28
 ACEA (2013, p. 46). 
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to 3.20%-3.10%. Furthermore, ACEA carried out estimates of the future NGMC-
related annual saved generation for each primary substation on which their adoption 
is planned. Such values were updated yearly based on the expected increase in the 
city’s electricity demand, specified in section 2.2.4, to get an overall assessment of 
energy savings in Rome. These are then converted in tons of CO2-eq, and monetised 
based on the assumptions on carbon prices and emission factors that were detailed 
in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5 above: 
22 COtt
PEFCO=SB 
 
where: 
SB = societal benefits coming NGMC-related from avoided emissions 
∆CO2 = decreased CO2 emissions thanks to the project (in tons) 
EF = LCA emission factors  
PCO2 = estimated monetary social value of one ton of avoided emissions 
The benefits calculated according to the above formula were added into the financial 
model and discounted in the same way: 
 
N
t=
t
t
SB
SDR+
SB
=NPV
1 1  
where SDR stands for the Social Discount Rate discussed in section 2.2.1 above. As 
already mentioned, this rate is subjected to sensitivity analysis, so that the related 
elements of uncertainty are taken into account. 
Societal benefits are a result of all the efforts taken in all the sub-projects supporting 
a Smart Grid. It is for this reason that this analysis focused on the benefit of all sub-
projects as a whole, instead of specifically assigning these benefits to one or another 
sub-project29. For the sake of simplicity, this analysis assigns the societal benefits as if 
                                                        
29
 Project 3 could not be operational without the measures taken in projects 1 and 2. Projects 1 and 2 are 
undertaken as their output allows project 3 to be realised. 
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derived only by sub-project 3, which is supposed to implement the Smart Grids and 
the related network automation (new grid management criteria). 
The monetised benefits from a DSO perspective are integrated with the monetised 
societal benefits in the tables below. The two previous assumptions adopted for the 
financial model (error margin in the monetisation of benefits and average rate of 
benefit decrease linked to the investments made) were kept unchanged in the 
societal model30. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Incentives and saved MWh for Malagrotta project (a) and Rome (b) 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
30
 Taxes have not been taken into account as recommended by the JRC methodology. 
a) b) 
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2.3.9. Societal CBA - Results 
The following table shows the results in terms of NPV and Internal Rate of Return of 
the Societal Cost Benefit Analysis applied to the three projects in Malagrotta and in 
the whole of the city of Rome. 
Societal CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Project Smart Grid (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 1,104   K€ 39,119 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.25%   16.67% 
Table 8: Outcomes of the CBA for the Malagrotta project and its extension to the Rome 
area – Societal approach (values in K€, base year 2014) 
It can be seen that, as anticipated, the fundamental result presented above for the 
Private investor CBA carries over to the Societal CBA. Furthermore, let it be noted 
that both NPVs increase by a remarkable amount. As will also emerge from the 
Sensitivity Analysis here below, this is due in larger measure (and is hence much 
more sensitive) to the lower value of SDR w.r.t. FDR, than to the monetisation of 
externalities such as avoided GHG emissions. 
As above, we can implement these results by disaggregating the values for each sub-
project, as shown in Table 9: 
Societal CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
Automation (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 362   K€ 11,033 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.55%   12.55% 
        
Societal CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
MV/LV monitoring (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 410   K€ 26,274 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 0.61%   21.17% 
        
Societal CBA MALAGROTTA   ROMA 
New Management Criteria (Pilot)   (Scale-up) 
NPV (Net Present Value year 2014) -K€ 376   K€ 1,688 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) 1.18%   12.74% 
 
Table 9: Sum up of outcomes of the CBA for the Malagrotta sub-projects and their 
extension to the Rome area – Societal approach 
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2.4.  Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is a necessary component of a CBA, as it shows the impact of 
uncertainty/variations of key variables on the results of the analysis. The parameters 
that have been considered for the sensitivity analysis are detailed in the following 
table. 
Parameters for Sensitivity Analysis Unit 
Baseline 
Model 
Value 
Values’ 
Range 
Real Financial Discount Rate (FDR) %/year 3% 0% ± 8% 
Real Social Discount Rate (SDR) %/year 2.5% 0% ± 5% 
Average uncertainty in monetisation of 
benefits 
% 3% -2% ±17% 
Average rate of decrease of benefits 
related to investments in infrastructure 
%/year 5% 2% ±11% 
Average rate of decrease of benefits 
related to investments in software 
%/year 1% 0% ± 8% 
Average Rate of increase OPEX %/year 0% 0% ± 6% 
Average Rate of increase CAPEX %/year 0% 0% ± 16% 
Emission Factor 
ton CO2-
eq/MWhe 
0.708 0.50 ± 0.95 
1 ton CO2-eq average price in EU ETS € 15 0 ± 50 
Table 10: Sensitivity analysis – input parameters for the financial models 
 
The results for the private-investor and societal sensitivity analyses are presented in 
the next paragraphs: 
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i. first for each of the pilot's three sub-projects separately (MV grid automation, 
LV monitoring and New Grid Management Criteria);  
ii. then for the aggregate Malagrotta project;  
iii. finally, for the scale-up to Rome's distribution network. 
In this way, we can easily compare how variations in each parameter's value might 
yield significant or negligible impacts, depending on the scale of the intervention 
(pilot's sub-project, pilot as a whole or entire distribution network). 
It should be noted that the impact of potential OPEX and CAPEX yearly cost increases 
over and above the baseline yearly inflation rate. This test was only performed on the 
whole of Rome, as the Malagrotta project is included in it and most of the CAPEX 
and OPEX expenses yet to be incurred obviously regard the Smart Grid scale-up to 
Rome's network, as historical values have been taken into account when calculating 
the NPVs for both Malagrotta and the three sub-projects.  
The aim is to capture the possible effects of a sharp increase of imported inflation on 
the cost of physical capital. As seen, such effects are assumed to concentrate on 
CAPEX, where capital intensity is likely higher, and reach rather aggressive values (up 
to 16% yearly increase), as a conservative measure to cover the possibility of 
spiralling inflation. As will be seen presently, not even rather dramatic scenarios such 
as these can drive the project’s NPVs for Rome below zero. 
 
2.4.1. Sensitivity analysis sub-project 1: MV Automation 
Table 11 reports the results of sensitivity analysis of selected parameters on the NPV 
for project 1 (Automation of Medium Voltage grid), where the red areas show lower 
NPV values. Cells in yellow show NPVs calculated according to baseline parameters, 
as reported in Table 3, whereas the figures in the green or red areas represent 
variations in NPV as parameter values change.  
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 While the CBA outcomes may change significantly depending on the variation of key 
variables considered, under no circumstances are the signs of the NPV values 
overturned, confirming JRC's CBA methodology as an appropriate tool for 
investment decisions. 
Financial discount rate 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0%     
Rome 17,007 14,412 12,097 10,026 8,171 6,505 5,006 3,655 2,434     
Malagrotta -8 -139 -261 -374 -481 -582 -678 -769 -856     
                        
Pct of uncertainty of 
benefits monetisation 
-2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 17.0% 
Rome 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,017 9,979 9,941 9,903 9,884 
Malagrotta -368 -370 -373 -376 -378 -381 -383 -386 -388 -391 -392 
                        
Yearly decrease rate of 
benefits from 
infrastructure 
2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0%   
Rome 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 9,952 
  
  
Malagrotta -349 -358 -367 -374 -381 -388 -394 -400 -405 -410 
  
  
                        
Pct of electricity 
demand  
increase per year 
-1.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5%           
Rome 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 10,026 
          
          
Malagrotta -387 -384 -381 -378 -374 -371 
          
          
                        
Yearly increase in  
CAPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0%     
Rome 10,026 9,834 9,638 9,438 9,235 9,028 8,817 8,603 8,385 
    
    
    
                        
Yearly increase in  
OPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0%               
Rome 10,026 9,950 9,859 9,751 
              
              
 
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis of private investor's CBA for sub-project 1 – MV 
Automation (values in K€, base year 2014). 
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It can be noticed that Malagrotta and Rome display a different behaviour in the 
sensitivity analysis for variations of the percentage of electricity demand increase per 
year: this is a consequence of the introduction of the cap on benefits from avoided 
penalties which was discussed in section 2.3.5. As soon as these exceed €5.5 mln, the 
value factored in the computation of NPVs will remain constant. This fact becomes 
even more apparent in the case of yearly decrease of infrastructure-related benefits, 
where NPVs only start dwindling after such decline in benefits is rapid enough to 
reduce their overall amount below the defined cap. 
 
Social discount rate 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 
Rome 17,007 15,672 14,412 13,222 12,097 11,033 10,026 9,074 8,171 7,316 6,505 
Malagrotta -51 -118 -182 -244 -304 -362 -418 -473 -526 -577 -627 
 
Table 12: Sensitivity analysis of societal CBA for sub-project 1 – MV Automation 
(values in K€, base year 2014) 
 
 
As for the Societal CBA, Table 12 shows the impact of changing values of SDR, i.e. the 
only parameter driving the difference between societal and private investor CBA for 
this sub-project: despite the huge variation in NPVs, the CBA outcome stays very 
positive throughout. 
 
 
2.4.2. Sensitivity analysis sub-project 2: LV Monitoring and Remote Control 
 
Table 13 and Table 14 report the results of the sensitivity analysis for sub-project 2 
(LV Monitoring and Remote Control) for the private-investor and the societal CBAs. 
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Financial 
discount rate 
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
  
Rome 36,241 31,897 28,039 24,608 21,550 18,819 16,376 14,188 12,224 
  
Malagrotta -153 -260 -361 -456 -546 -632 -713 -791 -866 
  
            Pct of 
uncertainty of 
benefits 
monetisation 
-2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 17.0% 
Rome 24,662 24,640 24,619 24,597 24,576 24,554 24,532 24,511 24,489 24,468 24,457 
Malagrotta -455 -455 -456 -457 -457 -458 -459 -459 -460 -460 -461 
            
Yearly decrease 
rate of benefits 
from 
infrastructure 
2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 
 
Rome 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,558  
 
Malagrotta -450 -452 -454 -456 -458 -460 -461 -463 -464 -465  
 
            
Pct of electricity 
demand  
increase per 
year 
-1.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 
     
Rome 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608      
     
Malagrotta -459 -459 -458 -457 -456 -455      
     
            Yearly increase 
in  
CAPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 
  
Rome 24,608 24,078 23,527 22,954 22,357 21,737 21,093 20,424 19,730 
  
  
  
            
Yearly increase 
in  
OPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 
       
Rome 24,608 24,575 24,537 24,491        
       
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis of private investor's CBA for sub-project 2 – LV 
Monitoring and Remote Control (values in K€, base year 2014) 
 
Although the NPV for this sub-project is expected to remain positive, it is interesting 
to note that uncertainty over benefits monetisation, yearly rate of benefit decline, 
percentage of electricity demand increase per year and yearly increase in OPEX costs 
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do not make any significant difference on the sub-project's outcome, pointing to the 
FDR as only source of variation of NPV across the time-horizon considered. 
The divergence in the dynamics of Malagrotta’s and Rome’s sensitivity analyses has 
the same explanation as for sub-project 1, with the only difference that (as already 
seen in Figure 7 of Section 2.3.5) sub-project 2 results in higher benefits. Again, this 
is particularly evident for the same two parameters. Resulting NPVs remain constant 
as demand increases and benefits decline: indeed, total benefits for this sub-project 
exceed the €5.5 mln cap for all values of these parameters that were considered. 
Table 14 reports the Societal CBA’s sensitivity analysis for sub-project 2, once again 
for SDR only. A wider range of variation w.r.t. sub-project 1 can be noted; however, 
even for extreme SDR values, the CBA proves to have significantly positive economic 
effects from a societal standpoint. 
Social discount rate 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 
Rome 36,241 34,004 31,897 29,911 28,039 26,274 24,608 23,035 21,550 20,146 18,819 
Malagrotta -153 -207 -260 -312 -361 -410 -456 -502 -546 -589 -632 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity analysis of Societal CBA for sub-project 2 – LV Monitoring and 
Remote Control (values in K€, base year 2014) 
 
2.4.3. Sensitivity analysis sub-project 3: New Grid Management Criteria 
 
Table 15 and Table 16 report the results of the sensitivity analysis for both the private 
investor's and societal CBA for of sub-project 3 (New grid management criteria) for 
Malagrotta and the whole city of Rome. 
Once again, it can be readily seen that neither for Malagrotta nor for Rome does any 
parameter value in the ranges considered revert the signs of NPVs. It is remarkable, 
however, that the margin keeping the values of this sub-project above (or below) 
50 
 
zero is significantly smaller than for the previous two. Extreme FDR values, in 
particular manage to drive its figures relatively close to this limit. 
Financial discount rate 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
  
Rome 2,320 1,984 1,681 1,406 1,155 926 716 522 344 
  
Malagrotta -98 -217 -328 -432 -529 -620 -706 -788 -866 
  
            
Pct of uncertainty of 
benefits monetisation 
-2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 17.0% 
Rome 1,506 1,466 1,426 1,386 1,346 1,306 1,266 1,227 1,187 1,147 1,127 
Malagrotta -430 -431 -431 -432 -432 -433 -433 -434 -434 -435 -435 
            
Yearly decrease rate of 
benefits from software 
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
  
Rome 1,517 1,406 1,303 1,206 1,117 1,033 955 882 814   
  
Malagrotta -430 -432 -433 -435 -436 -437 -438 -439 -440   
  
            
Pct of electricity demand  
increase per year 
-1.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 
     
Rome 1,210 1,257 1,305 1,354 1,406 1,459      
     
Malagrotta -435 -434 -433 -432 -432 -431      
     
            
Yearly increase in  
CAPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 
  
Rome 1,406 1,403 1,399 1,395 1,392 1,387 1,383 1,379 1,374   
  
            
Yearly increase in  
OPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 
       
Rome 1,406 1,403 1,400 1,396        
       
Table 15: Sensitivity analysis Private investor's CBA for sub-project 3 - New Grid 
Management Criteria (values in K€, base year 2014) 
 
Analogously to the previous two sub-projects, Table 16 shows the results of the 
sensitivity analysis on the relevant parameters for the New Management Criteria sub-
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project from a societal standpoint. Once again, for all the relevant changes in 
parameters values, resulting NPVs can be considered rather stable for Malagrotta 
and Rome alike. 
Social discount rate 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 
  
Rome 2,514 2,331 2,158 1,994 1,837 1,688 1,546 1,411 1,282 1,158 1,040   
  
Malagrotta -93 -154 -212 -269 -323 -376 -427 -477 -525 -571 -616   
  
              
Price of ton of CO2-eq 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50   
Rome 1,342 1,457 1,573 1,688 1,804 1,920 2,035 2,151 2,266 2,382 2,497   
  
Malagrotta -381 -379 -378 -376 -375 -373 -372 -370 -368 -367 -365   
  
              
Emission factor 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 
Rome 1,587 1,601 1,616 1,631 1,645 1,660 1,675 1,689 1,704 1,719 1,733 1,748 1,763 
Malagrotta -378 -377 -377 -377 -377 -377 -376 -376 -376 -376 -376 -375 -375 
 
Table 16: Sensitivity analysis of Societal CBA for sub-project 3 - New Grid Management 
Criteria (values in K€, base year 2014) 
 
2.4.4. Sensitivity analysis of aggregate Smart Grids project (all three sub-
projects together) 
 
Finally, Table 17 and Table 18 present the results of the sensitivity analysis for the 
overall Smart Grid project (MV automation, LV monitoring and remote control and 
new grid management criteria). 
Expectedly, the sensitivity analysis confirms the negative NPV of the Malagrotta 
project from both the private investor's and the societal point of view (although with 
much less negative values in the latter case). As explained, such results are quite 
expected when dealing with a pilot project; however, no scale-up of Smart Grid 
solutions would have been possible without the realisation of the pilot, and no real 
data to carry out a reliable CBA would have been available. 
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Financial 
discount rate 
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
  
Rome 55,449 48,194 41,735 35,972 30,821 26,206 22,065 18,341 14,987 
  
Malagrotta -259 -617 -950 -1,262 -1,556 -1,834 -2,097 -2,348 -2,588 
  
            Pct of 
uncertainty of 
benefits 
monetisation 
-2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 17.0% 
Rome 36,220 36,121 36,022 35,922 35,823 35,724 35,624 35,525 35,426 35,327 35,277 
Malagrotta -1,253 -1,257 -1,260 -1,264 -1,268 -1,272 -1,275 -1,279 -1,283 -1,286 -1,288 
            
Yearly decrease 
rate of benefits 
from 
infrastructure 
2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 
 
Rome 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,972 35,849  
 
Malagrotta -1,231 -1,242 -1,253 -1,262 -1,271 -1,279 -1,287 -1,294 -1,300 -1,306  
 
            
Yearly decrease 
rate of benefits 
from software 
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
  
Rome 36,083 35,972 35,869 35,772 35,683 35,599 35,521 35,448 35,380 
 
 
 
Malagrotta -1,261 -1,262 -1,264 -1,265 -1,267 -1,268 -1,269 -1,270 -1,271   
  
            Pct of electricity 
demand  
increase per 
year 
-1.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 
     
Rome 35,776 35,823 35,871 35,920 35,972 36,025      
     
Malagrotta -1,281 -1,277 -1,272 -1,267 -1,262 -1,257      
     
            Yearly increase 
in  
CAPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 
  
Rome 35,972 35,246 34,496 33,719 32,915 32,084 31,225 30,337 29,420   
  
            Yearly increase 
in  
OPEX costs 
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 
       
Rome 35,972 35,835 35,673 35,482        
       
 
Table 17: Sensitivity analysis of Private investor CBA for ACEA’s Smart Grids project 
(values in K€, base year 2014) 
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In conclusion, let us see the results for the societal CBA concerning the parameters 
which are specific to it (the results for all other variables are essentially the same as 
for the private-investor CBA). As can be seen, under no considered scenario does the 
picture undergo any fundamental changes. 
Social discount 
rate 
0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 
  
Rome 55,887 52,133 48,592 45,252 42,098 39,119 36,303 33,642 31,124 28,741 26,484 
  
  
Malagrotta -254 -436 -612 -781 -945 -1,104 -1,258 -1,407 -1,552 -1,693 -1,830 
  
  
              Price of ton of 
CO2-eq 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
  
Rome 38,772 38,887 39,003 39,119 39,234 39,350 39,465 39,581 39,696 39,812 39,928 
  
  
Malagrotta -1,109 -1,107 -1,106 -1,104 -1,103 -1,101 -1,099 -1,098 -1,096 -1,095 -1,093 
  
  
              
Emission factor 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 
Rome 39,046 39,061 39,076 39,090 39,105 39,120 39,134 39,149 39,164 39,178 39,193 39,208 39,222 
Malagrotta -1,105 -1,105 -1,105 -1,104 -1,104 -1,104 -1,104 -1,104 -1,103 -1,103 -1,103 -1,103 -1,103 
 
Table 18: Sensitivity analysis of Societal CBA for ACEA’s Smart Grids project (values in 
K€, base year 2014)  
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3. Conclusions 
 
As seen in the preceding section, the positive overall effect of ACEA's Smart Grid 
project stands out from the analysis amidst the numerous sources of uncertainty that 
were taken into consideration. Given the figures above, the case for smartening the 
grid of the city of Rome seems to be undeniably there. Clearly, this is much 
reinforced by the singularly low values of Social Discount Factor of present-day Italy, 
which are arguably tied to specific macroeconomic circumstances and would 
obviously apply to any given investment project. However, it does not fade away 
even under the fairly high Financial Discount Factors that were explored during the 
sensitivity analysis. Similarly, even accounting for substantial amounts of uncertainty 
in benefits monetisation (17% of reduction) does not overturn Rome's positive NPV 
estimates, both in the societal and private-investor CBAs. In this context, as already 
noted, the Malagrotta pilot project seems to be playing very well its pioneering role 
towards the extension of the infrastructure to the whole of the city. 
It seems wise that an exercise of this sort be concluded by a word of caution. No 
Cost Benefit Analysis of such a complex and strategic commodity as electricity can 
aim at anything nearing exactness. Indeed, beside the above-discussed uncertainties 
associated with the monetisation attempts that were carried out, further aspects and 
channels of impact of Smart Grids were considered for monetisation, and eventually 
discarded. 
Possibly the most relevant is the one regarding other polluting substances released 
in the course of power generation, such as NOx, SOx, PM10 and PM2.5. The literature 
on social cost monetisation of these substances (whose main impact is on health 
rather than climate) still has to reach an agreement even on several methodological 
issues. This is further compounded by the fact that, unlike CO2, all the above are local 
pollutants, whose dispersion in the wider atmosphere is oftentimes a rather slow 
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phenomenon. Hence, their effect strongly depends on the previous concentration in 
the area of emission, so that a Pigouvian tax aiming to capture their Social Marginal 
Costs should be varying across space and time. Clearly, in the face of such 
complexities, an attempt at monetisation at this stage would run a substantial risk of 
being little more than a finger in the air. 
It is essential that any further work aiming at quantifying real economic impacts of 
Smart Grid project infrastructure bases its analyses on reliable and first-hand data. 
Therefore, the key for this work has been the dedicated cooperation of ACEA's 
personnel, who together with the JRC have developed from scratch complex metrics 
to capture the potential monetary effects of improvements in the quality of electricity 
supply (duration and number of interruptions mostly) that Smart Grid solution can 
determine. These metrics constitute the key step of JRC's CBA methodology, i.e. 
mapping assets into functionalities and then benefits. 
Additionally, it is worth noting how active end-consumers are expected to be central 
for the large-scale roll-out of Smart Grids. This reminds one of the fact that the 
impact of each Smart Grid project can go beyond what can be captured in monetary 
terms; therefore, in order to obtain a more complete picture of the Smart Grid 
scalability challenges, the financial/economic CBA should be complemented with 
targeted studies on the end-consumer role and non-monetary appraisals of non-
quantifiable impacts and externalities (e.g. social/health impacts, contribution to 
policy goals).  
It can be concluded that ACEA's Malagrotta project clearly constitutes an extremely 
positive experience, one that bodes well for the deployment of Smart Grid 
infrastructure across EU countries and beyond, as well as for the general effort 
towards a more sustainable electricity system in Europe. The JRC will continue 
monitoring the progress of this and other projects by working with relevant Smart 
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Grid stakeholders in order to shed light on whether and how Smart Grids present a 
viable business case for investors and society as a whole.    
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